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Evaluation of Circuit Judge Kavanaugh’s Opinions Concerning the CAA.
Arnold W. Reitze, Jr.
S.J. Quinney College of Law
The University of Utah
arnold.reitze@law.utah.edu
August 4, 2018
Nineteen opinions by Circuit Judge Kavanaugh in the D.C. Circuit dealing with the
Clean Air Act (CAA) were reviewed. In eleven of the cases, Circuit Judge Kavanaugh wrote
the majority opinion. In two cases he wrote a concurring opinion and in six cases he
dissented. The cases where Circuit Judge Kavanaugh wrote the majority opinion are: (1)
Americans for Clean Energy v. EPA, 864 F.3d 691 (2017); (2) Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. EPA,
866 F.3d 451(2017); (3) Energy Future Coalition v. EPA, 793 F.3d 141 (2015); (4) EME
Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 795 F.3d 118 (2015); (5) In re Murray Energy v. EPA, 788
F.3d 330 (2015); (6) National Ass’n of Manufacturers v. EPA, 750 F.3d 921 (2014); (7) NRDC
v. EPA, 749 F.3d 1055 (2014); (8) American Road & Transportation Builders Ass’n v. EPA,
705 F.3d 453 (2013); (9) Honeywell International, Inc. v. EPA, 705 F.3d 470 (2013); (10)
EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7 (2012, rehearing en banc denied Jan. 24,
2013); and (11) American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, 600 F.3d 624 (2010).
Circuit Judge Kavanaugh’s concurring opinions are found in; (1) Utility Air
Regulatory Group v. EPA, 744 F.3d 741 (2014); and (2) Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA,
722 F.3d 401 (2013). His dissents are found at: (1) Mexichem Specialty Resins, Inc. v. EPA,
787 F.3d 544 (2015); (2) (2) White Stallion Energy Center, LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222 (D.C.
Cir. 2014); (3)Texas v. EPA, 726 F.3d 180 (2013); (4) Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d
169 (2012); (5) Sierra Club v. EPA, 536 F.3d 673 (2008), and (6) Coalition for Responsible
Regulation v. EPA, 2012 WL 6621785 (Dec. 20, 2012).
Discussion
Circuit Judge Kavanaugh’s opinions in these air pollution cases demonstrate an impressive
knowledge of the Clean Air Act (CAA). His opinions are thoroughly researched; his
arguments are well organized; and his writing quality is excellent. When deciding a case,
Judge Kavanaugh’s loadstone is the doctrine of separation of powers as embodied in
articles 1,2, and 3 of the U.S. Constitution. This is combined with his focus on the literal
language of the statute. He believes a court’s assessment of an agency’s compliance with
statutory limits does not depend on whether the agency’s policy is good or whether the
agency’s intentions are laudatory. Even when that is true, the courts must enforce statutory
limits. His view is that a court’s job, is not to make the policy choices, but it is to carefully but
firmly enforce the statutory boundaries.
In a controversy involving the protection of the environment versus the protection
of the powers of Congress, his priority is protecting the legislative branch from efforts by
EPA to expand its authority through its interpretation of the CAA. In the eleven CAA cases
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in which Circuit Judge Kavanaugh wrote the majority opinion, ten involved industry
petitioners. In six of the cases the petition was denied; in four the court remanded the case
back to EPA. His remands are often based on his view that EPA regulations or other actions
exceed the Agency’s statutory powers.
Judge Kavanaugh’s record is impressive. His professional activities are an open
book. But the decision to support his nomination will not be based on his qualifications.
Chief Circuit Court Judge Merrick Garland had outstanding qualifications when he was
nominated but no proceeding were ever held by the Senate. A decision to approve him for a
position on the Supreme Court will be based on whether a majority of the Senate will
support his conservative views. In terms of the impact on air pollution control, he can be
expected to support a stronger Congress and a weaker EPA, which is likely to lead to a
relaxation of air pollution control regulation.
Case summaries
Brief summaries of the nineteen cases follow. Because many cases involve multiple
claims for relief only the most important issues that shape the final result are discussed.
Majority opinions
Americans for Clean Energy v. EPA, 864 F.3d 691 (2017)
Various organizations, companies, and interest groups petitioned for review of the
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) final rule setting renewable fuel requirements
for transportation fuel. Circuit Judge Kavanaugh held: EPA’s interpretation of the
“inadequate domestic supply” waiver provision for the CAA’s renewable fuel program was
inconsistent with the CAA. The petition was granted in part, denied in part, vacated in part,
and remanded in part.
Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.3d 451(2017)
Manufacturers of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) petitioned for a review of EPA’s decision to
remove HFCs from list of substitutes for ozone-depleting substances and place it on list of
prohibited ozone-depleting substances. The primary issue was whether EPA had statutory
authority to issue the 2015 Rule regulating HFCs. EPA issued the rule based on CAA § 612,
which requires the replacement of ozone-depleting substances with safe substitutes.
However, HFCs are not ozone-depleting substances. Therefore, the court vacated rule 2015
and remanded the case to EPA.
Energy Future Coalition v. EPA, 793 F.3d 141 (2015)
EPA adopted regulations that require vehicle manufacturers to test the emissions from new
vehicles using a “test fuel that is “commercially available.” Petitioners want EPA to approve
E30, which is a fuel that contains about 30% ethanol, for use as a test fuel. But E30 is not
yet “commercially available,” as required by EPA’s test fuel regulation. Biofuel producers
petitioned for review of final action of EPA, arguing that the Agency’s test fuel regulation
was arbitrary and capricious. The court held EPA’s regulation was reasonable and rooted in
the CAA, and thus not arbitrary and capricious. The petition was denied.
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EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 795 F.3d 118 (2015)
A group of state and local governments, joined by industry and labor groups, petitioned for
review of EPA’s Transport Rule, which called for cost-effective allocation of emission
reductions among upwind states in order to improve air quality in polluted downwind
areas. This provision is known as the good neighbor provision. The D.C. Circuit vacated the
rule. The Supreme Court, 134 S.Ct.1584, reversed and remanded the case. On remand,
Circuit Judge Kavanaugh, held that: EPA’s 2014 sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions budgets for
Texas, Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina that required those States to reduce emissions
were invalid; EPA’s 2014 ozone-season NOx emissions budgets that related to 1997 8–hour
ozone national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for upwind States that required
each of those States to reduce emissions were invalid The case was remanded without
vacatur.
In re Murray Energy v. EPA, 788 F.3d 330 (2015)
A coal company and states petitioned for review of EPA’s proposed rule restricting carbon
dioxide emissions from existing power plants. Circuit Judge Kavanaugh, held that proposed
rule was not final agency action subject to judicial review. The petition was denied.
National Ass’n of Manufacturers v. EPA, 750 F.3d 921 (2014)
Manufacturers’ association and industry groups petitioned for review of the EPA’s lowering
of the National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for fine particulate matter from 15.0
μg/m 3 to 12.0 μg/m 3.
Circuit Judge Kavanaugh held that EPA’s decision to lower the NAAQS for particulate
matter and its decision to eliminate the use of spatial averaging to demonstrate compliance
with the NAAQS was not unreasonable. In addition, EPA’s addition of a near-road
component to the monitoring network for demonstrating NAAQS compliance was not
unreasonable.
The petition was denied.
NRDC v. EPA, 749 F.3d 1055 (2014)
Environmental associations petitioned for review of final actions of EPA concerning its
rules under the CAA to limit emissions of certain pollutants from cement plants.
Circuit Judge Kavanaugh held that EPA’s interpretation of the CAA’s “other requirements
preserved” provision and its decision to allow consideration of cost-effectiveness as a
component of the cost analysis for emissions standards was reasonable; but the Agency
exceed its authority in adopting affirmative defense to private civil suits under the CAA.
The court granted the petitions for review with regard to EPA’s affirmative defense, and it
vacated those portions of the 2013 Rule pertaining to the defense, but it denied the
petitions in all other respects.
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American Road & Transportation Builders Asso. v. EPA, 705 F.3d 453 (2013, rehearing
en banc denied April 30, 2013)
This trade organization petitioned for review of an order of EPA to amend two regulations
implementing section 209 of the CAA prohibiting states from imposing certain emissionsrelated regulations on nonroad engines and vehicles. ARTBA began bringing those
challenges several years after the regulations relating to nonroad engines and vehicles
were promulgated. However, the petition for review was dismissed because venue was not
proper in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia on claim challenging EPA’s
approval of California’s state implementation plan (SIP), and, in addition, the challenge to
EPA’s regulations was time-barred.
Honeywell International, Inc. v. EPA, 705 F.3d 470 (2013)
EPA administers a cap-and-trade program regulating the production and consumption of
hydrochlorofluorocarbons. It incorporated competitors prior hydrochlorofluorocarbon
(HCFC) transfers into subsequent baseline allowances which reduced other manufacturers’
HCFC market share and allowances under cap-and-trade program. The manufacturers
petitioned for judicial review. Because there is an overall cap on HCFC–22 production, this
is a zero-sum system: The increased allowances to Arkema and Solvay in turn reduced
Honeywell’s market share and allowances of HCFC–22. However, the Court in Arkema, Inc.
v. EPA concluded that those permanent transfers were valid under the Clean Air Act. Absent
en banc review, this decision is circuit precedent. And because Honeywell’s other
challenges to the 2008 transfers are meritless, the court denied the petitions for review.
EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012, rehearing en banc
denied Jan. 24, 2013).
This case involves the “good neighbor” provision of the CAA that requires states to prevent
sources within their borders from emitting federally determined “amounts” of pollution
that travel across State lines and “contribute significantly” to a downwind State’s
“nonattainment” of federal air quality standards. In August 2011, to implement the
statutory good neighbor requirement, EPA promulgated the rule at issue in this case, the
Transport Rule, also known as the Cross–State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR). The Transport
Rule defines emissions reduction responsibilities for 28 upwind States based on those
States’ contributions to downwind States’ air quality problems. The Rule limits emissions
from upwind States’ coal- and natural gas-fired power plants, among other sources. The
Transport Rule targets two of those pollutants, sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides
(NOx).
Circuit Judge Kavanaugh held that EPA exceeded its statutory authority under the “good
neighbor” provision of the Clean Air Act in implementing the Transport Rule, and EPA
could not issue Federal Implementation Plans (FIPs) without giving States an initial
opportunity to implement the required emissions reductions through State
Implementation Plans (SIPs) or through SIP revisions. The CSAPR was vacated and
remanded.
American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, 600 F.3d 624 (2010)
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The petitioners representing the United States trucking industry petitioned for review of
EPA’s decision to authorize California’s rule limiting emissions from in-use non-road
engines, particularly transportation refrigeration units (TRU) powered by diesel engines.
Congress has given California the primary role in regulating emissions from in-use nonroad engines. EPA must approve a proposed California regulation unless: (1) EPA finds that
California unreasonably determined that its rule is at least as protective of public health
and welfare as the relevant federal standards; (2) EPA concludes that California does not
need the proposed standard “to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions” in
California; or (3) EPA finds that California’s standards “are not consistent with” the CAA’s
requirements that requires EPA to assess whether the California rule prevents other states
from deciding to “adopt and enforce” the California rule.
Circuit Judge Kavanaugh held that EPA’s conclusion that California’s rule was needed was
not arbitrary and capricious; the rule did not impose a de facto national rule that precluded
other states from declining to follow it; and EPA adequately considered cost of compliance.
The petition was denied.
Concurring opinions
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 744 F.3d 741 (2014)
This case involved petitions by a State and industry group challenging final rules issued by
EPA regulating particulate matter from fossil-fuel-fired steam generating units. The focus
of the petitioners was on the rule’s requirements for monitoring and measuring emissions
Chief Judge Garland, writing for the majority, upheld the rules by finding they were not
arbitrary and capricious. Circuit Judge Kavanaugh concurred with the decision, and his
opinion merely made the observation that the exhaustion/finality rule used by the majority
should not be considered jurisdictional.
Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 722 F.3d 401 (2013)
In this case, environmental groups petitioned for review of EPA’s administrative action,
which deferred regulation of “biogenic” carbon dioxide, which includes ethanol, for a
period of three years. In support of this so-called Deferral Rule, EPA’s Deferral Rule
exempts from regulation biogenic carbon dioxide sources that trigger the PSD and Title V
permitting programs at Step Two of the Tailoring Rule. The rule accomplishes this by
amending the regulatory definition of “greenhouse gases” to exclude biogenic carbon
dioxide. The so-called “anyway” sources that obtained PSD and Title V permits during Step
One of the Tailoring Rule, however, must still install BACT for their biogenic carbon dioxide
emissions. The Deferral Rule has a three-year sunset provision whereas the de minimis
doctrine “is used to establish permanent exemptions.” Given this concession, the Deferral
Rule cannot be sustained under the de minimis doctrine. The one-step-at-a-time doctrine,
which EPA does defend, authorizes agencies to promulgate regulations in a piecemeal
fashion. However, EPA’s invocation of the one-step-at-a-time doctrine was arbitrary and
capricious. Therefore, the administrative action was vacated.
Circuit Judge Kavanaugh in his concurring opinion stated there is zero basis in the text of
the Clean Air Act for EPA to distinguish biogenic carbon dioxide from other sources of
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carbon dioxide that EPA is required to regulate for purposes of the PSD and Title V
permitting programs. statute does not give EPA the authority to distinguish a stationary
source’s emissions of biogenic carbon dioxide from emissions of other forms of carbon
dioxide for purposes of these permitting programs. He stated “I have mixed feelings about
this case. That’s because I believe, contrary to this Circuit’s precedent, that the PSD statute
does not cover carbon dioxide, whether biogenic or not.” However, he believes the court is
bound to apply the precedent that requires EPA is required to regulate carbon dioxide
under the PSD and Title V permitting programs. There is no statutory basis for exempting
biogenic carbon dioxide.
Dissenting opinions
Mexichem Speciality Resins, Inc. v. EPA, 787 F.3d 544 (2015)
Manufacturers of polyvinyl chloride challenged EPA’s rule limiting emissions of hazardous
air pollutants. The court upheld EPA’s rule including its rule requiring all releases of
pollutants by pressure relief devices to meet the rule’s process vent emissions limits. The
rule was held not to be arbitrary and capricious, and the petition was denied.
Circuit Judge Kavenaugh dissented in part. EPA’s PCV rule imposed limits on emissions of
hazardous air pollutants. But EPA later concluded that one category of those limits—the socalled wastewater limits on hazardous air pollutants that may be dissolved in
wastewater—was based on bad data. EPA therefore said it was reconsidering the
wastewater limits, and it would complete the reconsideration process in 2016.
Petitioners, contended that EPA’s flawed wastewater limits should be stayed under the
Administrative Procedure Act provision authorizing stays pending judicial review. Judge
Kavanaugh believes the petitioners are correct. They have demonstrated a likelihood of
success on the merits; they have shown irreparable harm; and they have precedent on their
side. EPA did not oppose a stay in this case. Given the circumstances, as well as precedent,
Judge Kavanaugh supported a stay of the wastewater limits pending judicial review, and he
dissented from the majority opinion’s decision not to stay EPA’s wastewater limits.
White Stallion Energy Center, LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
This case involves state, industry, labor and environmental entities that petitioned for
review of EPA’s final rule regulating hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) emitted from electric
utility steam generating units (EGUs). The majority opinion held that EPA reasonably relied
upon CAA criteria for delisting pollutants in determining necessity of regulating EGU
emissions; EPA reasonably concluded that it was not required to consider costs in
determining whether to regulation EGU emissions; and EPA reasonably concluded that it
could regulate all HAP emissions from EGUs. The court also determined that EPA findings
on health effects of mercury exposure supported regulating these EGU emissions, and EPA
reasonably relied upon chromium emissions data in assessing risks from non-mercury EGU
emissions. The petition was denied.
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Circuit Judge Kavanaugh filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Under
the CAA’s § 112(n) coal- and oil-fired electric utility steam generating units are held to a
different standard for hazardous air pollution emissions with EPA being charged with
making “appropriate and necessary” regulations. The statute is not clear concerning
whether costs must be considered. EPA did not consider costs, which are huge. Circuit
Judge Kavanaugh disagreed with the majority that upheld EPA’s exclusion of costs He
believes that “appropriate” mandates the consideration of costs. He also believes that
competitors of regulated companies should be considered to be within the zone of interests
needed to have standing under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Texas v. EPA, 726 F.3d 180 (2013)
The States of Texas and Wyoming and industry groups petitioned for review of five EPA
rules designed to ensure that permitting authority existed to issue greenhouse gas permits
under the CAA. Circuit Judge Rogers held that the states and industry groups failed to
establish the challenged rules caused them injury in fact, as required to establish
standing. Thus, the petitions were dismissed.
Circuit Judge Kavanaugh dissented. EPA’s GHG emissions regulations require states to
revise the portions of their SIPs incorporating the PSD program, which requires
construction permits for large construction projects. EPA set deadlines for states to update
their SIPs, which Texas and Wyoming did not meet. EPA then imposed FIPs, for Texas and
Wyoming. Petitioners challenged EPA’s action. Judge Kavanaugh looked at the relevant
EPA regulations, which gives States three years to revise their SIPs whenever new
pollutants, like greenhouse gases were regulated under EPA’s PSD regulations. EPA also
relied on an alternative ground in imposing a FIP on Texas. EPA retroactively disapproved
Texas’s pre-existing SIP because, according to EPA, the SIP was flawed when EPA approved
it 18 years earlier. But neither the Act nor EPA regulations require either an automatic
updating SIP or assurances that the state will update its plan. Therefore, Texas’s SIP was
not flawed when EPA approved it 18 years earlier, and it cannot be retroactively
disapproved on that basis. He would vacate the relevant EPA orders.
Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169 (2012)
Trade associations comprised of engine manufacturers, petroleum suppliers, and food
producers petitioned for review of EPA’s final actions that granted partial waivers under
the CAA approving introduction into commerce of E15, which is a blend of gasoline and
15% ethanol, for use in select motor vehicles and engines. Chief Judge Sentelle held that the
various petitioners lacked standing, and the petition was denied.
Circuit Judge Kavenaugh dissented. In order to issue the waiver under the statute, EPA had
to find that E15 would not cause any car models made after 1974 to fail to meet emissions
standards. EPA found that E15 could cause emissions failures in some cars made after 1974
(namely, in cars made between 1975 and 2000). Nonetheless, for the first time, EPA
granted what it termed a “partial waiver,” meaning that the waiver allowed E15 use only in
cars made after 2000.
Two important American industries could be negatively affected by EPA’s allegedly illegal
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E15 waiver, but the majority opinion rejected the petition based on a lack of standing.
Judge Tatel and Judge Kavanaugh agree that the food group had standing. But the majority
opinion found that the food group was not an aggrieved party (that is, it did not have
prudential standing) for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act. And the majority
opinion concluded that the petroleum group’s injury is not caused by EPA’s E15 waiver
decision, therefore it does not have Article III standing. Judge Kavanaugh believes both
groups had standing, and he provided a detailed brief on the law of standing. However, on
the merits he concludes that in order to issue the waiver under the statute, EPA had to find
that E15 would not cause any car models made after 1974 to fail to meet emissions
standards. EPA found that E15 could cause emissions failures in some cars made after 1974
(namely, in cars made between 1975 and 2000). Nonetheless, EPA still granted a “partial
waiver,” meaning that the waiver allowed E15 use only in cars made after 2000. Judge
Kavanaugh believes that “In granting the E15 partial waiver, EPA ran roughshod over the
relevant statutory limits.” He stated, “EPA’s disregard of the statutory text is open and
notorious—and not much more needs to be said.”
Sierra Club v. EPA, 536 F.3d 673 (2008),
Environmental organization filed a Petition for Review concerning EPA’s final order that
prevented state and local authorities from supplementing federal monitoring requirements
under the CAA. Circuit Judge Griffith held that the rule contravened a statutory directive
that stationary-source emission permits include adequate monitoring requirements, and
the preexisting monitoring rules were consistent with statute. The petition was granted in
part and denied in part.
Circuit Judge Kavanaugh dissented claiming the relevant statutory language supports the
rule. The CAA § 504(c) grants EPA the authority to determine whether state and local
permitting authorities can impose additional monitoring requirements that “conform to
any applicable regulation under subsection (b) of this section.” In turn, subsection (b) says
EPA “may by rule prescribe procedures and methods for determining compliance and for
monitoring and analysis of pollutants regulated under this chapter....” EPA has decided
state and local permitting authorities may not add new periodic monitoring requirements
when issuing permits. EPA determined that the permitting process is not the time and
place for state and local permitting authorities to add new periodic monitoring
requirements. Rather, if changes are to be made to the underlying monitoring
requirements, they should occur during the process for formulating and revising SIP, NSPS,
NESHAP, and other applicable requirements. Therefore, Judge Kavanaugh would reject
petitioners’ primary statutory argument and deny the petition in whole.
Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 2012 WL 6621785 (Dec. 20, 2012)
A central question in this case was how to construe the term “air pollutant” for purposes of
a statutory permitting requirement. Does the term “air pollutant” cover not just the six
criteria pollutants, but also greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide, which contribute to
global warming? Under the broader interpretation of “air pollutant” that encompasses
greenhouse gases, a far greater number of facilities would fall within the Prevention of
Significant Deterioration program and have to obtain pre-construction permits. That in
turn would impose significantly higher costs on businesses and individuals that are
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building new commercial or residential property. Judge Kavanaugh believed EPA exceeded
its statutory authority, and he disagreed with the panel opinion’s contrary conclusion.
He believes Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), is not controlling and the text and
context of the Prevention of Significant Deterioration program as a whole, demonstrates
the term “air pollutant” refers to the six criteria (NAAQS) air pollutants. EPA has long held
the PSD program regulates all pollutants regulated by the CAA and not just the six criteria
pollutants. This creates problems because the threshold for PSD applicability, if applied to
GHGs would trigger a dramatically higher number of facilities that would be subject to the
need for pre-construction permits. For this reason, EPA re-wrote the very specific 250–ton
trigger in the permitting requirement of the statute in its Tailoring Rule to raise the trigger
for GHG emissions from 250 tons to 100,000 tons. Judge Kavanaugh held that this rule if
upheld would allow agencies to adopt absurd or otherwise unreasonable interpretations of
statutory provisions and then edit other statutory provisions to mitigate the
unreasonableness. Allowing agencies to exercise that kind of statutory re-writing authority
could significantly enhance the Executive Branch’s power at the expense of Congress’s and
thereby alter the relative balance of powers in the administrative process.
He makes a compelling argument that the PSD program is limited to NAAQS pollutants, but
once a facility is subject to PSD section 7475(a)(4) imposes requirements on other
pollutants regulated by the Act, including GHGs, that include the need to meet BACT. In
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court explicitly relied on the fact that the Clean Air Act’s
definition of ‘air pollutant’ “did not produce “extreme” consequences in the context of
motor vehicle emissions. But, when applied to the PSD program EPA’s definition of air
pollutant produces extreme consequences. He concludes EPA chose an admittedly absurd
reading over a perfectly natural reading of the relevant statutory text. An agency cannot do
that.
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